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Abstract: Taking the evolution of the quality agenda in the UK as its centrepiece, this article 
analyses the politics of legitimation accompanying the emergence of quality assurance and 
the contribution of quality enhancement to the power play therein. This article argues that 
over the last twenty-five years the quality agenda has been used as a proxy – a state steering 
mechanism – to fulfil political ends and that two trends mark that history: the rise of the 
regulatory state and the development of quasi-markets. The article also places these issues 
into the contexts of globalisation and the emergence of regions of quality assurance around 
the world. However, what shapes the article is not this argument per se, but trying critically to 
reflect on the quality agenda as a political position, and see the ways in which the 
epistemology of higher education is embedded in the politics of both national reforms and 
international political relations.  
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Introduction 
This conceptual article revisits a topic central to higher education: the theme of ‘quality’. 
Taking the evolution of the quality agenda in the UK as its centerpiece, this article analyses 
the politics of legitimation accompanying the emergence of quality assurance, and the 
contribution of quality enhancement to the accompanying power play. It outlines three ideas. 
Firstly, it explores the nature of the legitimation problem of the quality agenda and considers 
the extent to which quality assurance agencies can be regarded as an epistemic community 
capable of responding to that problem through a regulatory contribution. Secondly, drawing 
on interviews with key players in the development of the quality agenda, and a range of 
documentary sources, it examines the policy discourse of quality assurance in terms of the 
balance of power expressed therein. Thirdly, the article notes that the theme of ‘quality’ is far 
broader than just developing a quality assurance process. The analysis deals with the 
contribution of the international discourse and networks of ‘quality’ to the evolving policy 





The empirical focus is the UK quality agenda, and particularly England. England has 
probably the most mature quality system in Europe and now one of the most heavily 
marketized systems of undergraduate education in the world. However it is important to 
recognise that higher education has been part of a more profound force of globalization (King 
2009) and, similarly, we can quickly focus the significance of that issue if we see it in a 
comparative light. Developments in quality arrangements in higher education take place not 
only within the context of the nation state but also within the context of supranational 
organizations and new regional actors have developed and lead to new forms of governance. 
The last part of the paper, therefore, will place the discussion into a wider context, 
particularly that of the European Union and the Bologna Process.  
 
The purpose of this article is to begin the development of an analytical framework through 
which the quality agenda and its implications for higher education can be better understood. 
In order to experience the politics inherent in such an endeavor, and to make the discussion 
somewhat more concrete, parts of policy texts will be discussed. Other empirical data are 
drawn from interviews with senior members of the main ‘quality bodies’ in the UK and 
Europe, particularly the Council for National Academic Awards (CNAA), the Higher 
Education Quality Council (HEQC), the Academic Audit Unit (AAU), the Quality Assurance 
Agency, and the European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education (ENQA) 
as well other key players and analysts in the quality debate. The interviews were conducted 
between 2004 and 2009, and the interview data are used mainly to illustrate the argument of 





The article argues that the quality agenda has been used as a proxy for the state to fulfil 
political ends and, through the use of quality as a state steering mechanism, two trends mark 
that history: the rise of the ‘regulatory state’ (Neave 2012) and the development of ‘quasi-
markets’ (Williams 2004). The quality agenda underpinned, gave meaning to the structures, 
processes and practices of higher education systems, to both teaching and learning; and in 
many ways it is still expected to do so. However, what shapes the article is not this argument 
per se, but trying critically to reflect on the quality agenda as an epistemic and political 
position, and see the ways in which the epistemology of higher education is embedded in the 
politics of both national reforms and international political relations. The conclusion of the 
article is that we have some unexpected challenges to resolve, including complex questions 
about policy transfer and power asymmetries. 
 
The current problem 
Following the announcement of the new Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF) for 
monitoring teaching quality in England, to replace the current quality assurance system of 
cyclical inspection (Jo Johnson, 1st July 2015) on Friday 6th November 2015, the UK 
government released a Green Paper on Higher Education for a Teaching Excellence 
Framework. The political significance of the Framework was summed up by Jo Johnson, the 
Minister of State for Universities and Science, who commented: ‘While there is a lot of 
excellence, there is also, as the sector acknowledges patchiness and variability in and 
between institutions. We’re helping the sector address that patchiness so we drive up the 
quality of teaching for everybody... Students should come out of their university years feeling 
they’ve got value for money for their time there.’ (Guardian, 6th Nov 2015). Although the 
notion of an explicit dependency between a new endeavour and the legitimacy necessary to 
maintain public trust in that endeavour is not new, the form of its realization in the case of the 
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teaching quality agenda highlights the problem of legitimation faced by the increasing 
marketization of higher education. 
 
Public trust in the quality agenda which combines institutional information about the quality 
of teaching and learning practices would not be problematic if the only foreseeable 
consequence was the opportunity to improve public higher education by understanding the 
interaction between pedagogical practices and the learning environment without encouraging 
the marketisation of higher education and offending traditional academic norms. Since this is 
not the case, and since the regulation of higher education has consistently demonstrated the 
sensitivity of the social context in the translation from policy to implementation, in which the 
politics of legitimation form a natural part of policy implementation. ‘Legitimations are the 
claims that dominant groups make about themselves – claims that they would naturally wish 
everyone else to accept. Legitimacy, on the other hand, refers to the contribution in which 
such claims have in fact been accepted and endorsed by subordinate groups’. (Weber in 
Parkin, 2000: 77-78). 
 
Legitimacy can be defined as ‘the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief 
that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society’ (Lipset 
1959: 77). Legitimacy gives authority to an institution, and in effect sanctions its power. It 
makes institutions valid in a society. In his book, Legitimation of Belief, Ernest Gellner 
(1974: 24) describes legitimacy as the term that conveys the fact that ‘such and such a 
personage, institution or procedure is held to be authoritative, binding or valid in a given 
society’. If this belief is not present, or if it exists in only tenuous form, a government’s 
ability to formulate and implement policy will be inhibited by its key stakeholders’ lack of 
trust in its institutional processes and outcomes (Dogan 1992). Stakeholders may decide not 
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to co-operate, to co-operate partially, or actively to oppose a particular policy initiative. 
Institutional legitimacy is, therefore, a sine qua non of any new policy development and it is 
of great importance for initiatives such as the quality agenda which has been dependent on 
the active co-operation of universities.  
 
The opposition to the creation of the teaching quality agenda and, therefore, legitimation 
problems, is often expressed in concerns about the allegedly unique nature of higher 
education and the implications for surveillance, state control, social justice and 
commercialisation (Collini 2012; Nixon 2001; Scott 2015). The extent to which a governance 
framework can protect higher education directly impacts on public trust in this regulatory 
field (King & Norton 2013). At the same time, one should not forget that whatever form of 
regulation is adopted has to be seen as legitimate by key stakeholders such as the academic 
community and the students (Clark 1983; Barnett 1992). Where industry is content with a 
regulatory framework that facilitates its economic interests, society more broadly may feel 
that certain public interests have been compromised in the interests of commercialisation 
(Bok 2003; Dill 2003). Alternatively, societal stakeholders may be content with arrangements 
that industry may regard as a constraint on its activities (Bok 2003). Thus, and as government 
has clearly recognized, higher education markets are dependent on the construction of 
particular forms of regulatory legitimacies (cf. Habermas 1976). 
 
When an issue such as the quality agenda is politicized, a policy community may feel that the 
construction of different forms of legitimacies is more appropriately achieved through an 
adaptation of the familiar than through the development of new institutional arrangements 
(cf. Weber 1970). The conventional approach to regulation has relied on technocratic 
epistemic communities to provide a ‘rational’ basis for policy decisions (Haas 1992). 
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However, the experience of the quality agenda has demonstrated the limited utility of the 
technocratic approach as seen by the increasing marketisation of higher education. In such a 
situation it can be anticipated that the state will turn to a familiar legitimation device – the use 
of an epistemic community – but also rearrange the order of discourses required (cf. Foucault 
1971, 2004). 
 
The nearly contemporary 
In the UK ‘quality’ emerged as a term with political currency in the early 1990s when the 
higher education discourse became engaged in the quality agenda, employing a variety of 
approaches and methodologies (Salter & Tapper 2000). Since the abolition of the binary line 
between polytechnics and universities in 1992, several institutional forms of ‘quality’ have 
been established with state support: the AAU, the HEQC, the QAA, and the Higher 
Education Academy (HEA) (Brown 2004).  So in the UK, public support for the quality 
agenda has been assured through governmental regulatory arrangements that have relied 
heavily for their legitimacy on the authority of ‘quasi-state institutions’ (Filippakou & Tapper 
2010). Characterized as the ‘technocratic approach’, these arrangements have usually taken 
the form of expert advisory groups closely integrated with the bureaucratic apparatus of 
regulatory policy-making and implementation (Goodwin & Grix 2011).  
 
However, while the idea of quality has been institutionalised, there is considerable political 
struggle as the quality movement becomes an indicator of political tension (cf. Brown 2004). 
Furthermore, as the political pressures for marketization intensify, there is a natural tendency 
for that agenda to be reformulated in response (Palfreyman & Tapper 2014). As the Green 
Paper (BIS 2015) implies, this approach has attempted to deal with the pressures generated 
by increasing diversity and marketisation. In the case of the Green Paper proposals most 
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institutional responses showed themselves to be at least as concerned about its implications 
for their cultural values as for the linkage between TEF and fees (UUK 2016). 
 
Despite the political struggles, the institutions of quality since 1992 share a common agenda, 
derived from the principles of increasing state control and more recently the marketisation 
agenda. These principles can be expressed as a set of methodologies, and in the following 
sections I offer an overview of the different elements and methodologies adopted by the 
different institutions of ‘quality’ in the UK.  There are discontinuities but also continuities, 
which can help to sharpen contemporary questions about ‘ways of understanding’ the quality 
agenda as well as the condition of higher education. 
 
External examiners  
The idea of academic standards was always a concern for UK higher education. UK higher 
education is distinct from other European higher education systems for its tradition of self-
regulation, as academics in British universities had invented their own way to maintain 
academic standards with the system of external examiners. Nowadays the system of external 
examiners remains one element of quality assurance, whilst in the past it was a system in its 
own right.  
 
The origins of the external examiner system can be traced back to 1832 when the University 
of Durham was established (Silver 1996). External examiners reports became one of the key 
elements in national quality assurance systems. However, in the 1990s doubts started to be 
raised, that the system of external examiners is a method that cannot assure comparability 
between programmes at the national level (UK interviewee). Specifically, it was the Dearing 
Committee that proposed a more ‘professional’ approach to the work of the external 
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examiners. This resulted in Recommendation 25, that its early work should include drawing 
up a UK-wide pool of academic staff recognized by the QAA from which institutions must 
select external examiners: ‘The remit of the external examiner will need to be consistent 
across the UK, necessitating thorough familiarization, training and preparation, including a 
trainee/apprentice model for new external examiners’. The government accepted all the 
recommendations concerning the quality agenda from the Dearing Report. However, the 
QAA – in the October 1998 issue of its bulletin, entitled the ‘Way Ahead’ – announced that 
‘[w]e are not proceeding with that proposal’, although the external examiner system is still 
discussed at policy making level.  
 
The polytechnic sector and the Council for National Academic Awards  
The history of quality in the UK higher education – in its institutional form and at national 
level – originates mainly from within the non-university sector of higher education. Although 
there had been prior regulatory bodies, a critical development was the creation of the CNAA. 
It was a degree awarding body established by Royal Charter in 1964 and disestablished in 
1992, when the polytechnics could apply for the university title.  
 
The Council’s main power was to award degrees to persons who had pursued ‘courses of 
study at educational and research establishments other than universities, and they were 
required to be comparable in standards to university awards’ (Lewis, 1990: 3). ‘To gain 
approval, the institution had to satisfy the CNAA that it had the necessary overall facilities 
and quality control systems’ (Silver, 1990: 3). There were visits to the institutions, while 
there was also an interaction between the members of the CNAA and the course team. For 




As Brown observes (2004: 36), ‘the CNAA was not just a regulatory body… It explored and 
in effect legitimized a series of developments which together transformed higher education’. 
The idea of the course team and the course leader has its origins in the polytechnic sector and 
the CNAA also introduced new subjects like business studies as well as new means of 
delivering programmes such as part-time degrees and modularization. Other examples were 
new ways of organizing learning such as independent learning and credit accumulation and 
transfer (Brown, ibid). Thus, it might be argued that the CNAA constructed new modes of 
higher education and – after the abolition of the binary line in 1992 – it still had a tacit impact 
on the UK system, as many traditional universities adopted these new modes of higher 
education.  
 
The Academic Audit Unit  
The AAU was the first external body for quality assurance in the university sector. It was 
established by the Committee of Vice Chancellors and Principals (CVCP) in September 1990 
and disbanded in July 1992. For one of the interviewees, the AAU was ‘essentially 
defensive… the universities were worried that the Government was going to try and impose 
an inspectorate on them of one sort of another’. A similar argument has been made also by 
Yorke (1996: 8): ‘it was widely believed at that time that the CVCP’s initiative would pre-
empt Government plans for the establishment of an independent external agency to undertake 
work of this kind’. In other words, the AAU was established by the sector itself in order to 
avoid state intervention. 
 
The aim of the AAU was to examine the quality assurance systems of universities and report 
on their effectiveness (Yorke, 1996: 8).  There were four main areas that were looked at: (i) 
programmes; (ii) teaching and learning; (iii) external examiners; and (iv) feedback to the 
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course team. As its title indicates, audit was the main element of the AAU. ‘[T]he technique 
we adopted was first of all documentation, secondly a visit and then thirdly a draft report 
which we showed to them and then we put a final report… there was no self evaluation’ 
(AAU interviewee). The reports of the AAU audits were not formally published by CVCP, as 
they were the property of the relevant institutions, but nearly all those audited have placed 
their reports in the public domain (Williams, 1994: vii). In the end institutions decided to 
make them publicly available when one institution’s report (at the institutions’ instigation) 
was published in the Times Higher Education Supplement (AAU interviewee). 
 
As an interviewee suggests, the AAU was undermined mainly because the government 
wanted to shift to inspections (an idea derived from school inspections): ‘It was quite clear to 
us, that, they weren’t interested in what we were doing; they had decided that they were 
going to have an inspection’. Similarly, a former vice-chancellor observes:  ‘The state was 
looking for wrong-doing and the thing about this there was a stage when its inspectorate in 
the secondary schools in the school system, OFSTED, under an ideologue, going round 
telling the Government that something like 1 in 10 secondary schools was failing’. 
 
The Funding Councils and the Higher Education Quality Council 
The Funding Councils until now have an important role to play in the national quality 
assurance arrangements. Immediately after the passage of the 1992 Further and Higher 
Education Act, HEFCE became the main body responsible for quality assurance in England, 
and with the abolition of the binary line between universities and polytechnics we also see the 




The HEQC took over responsibility for quality assurance, largely using the procedures of the 
AAU and drawing upon the staff of the CNAA and the Inspectorate, while in 1993 a new 
methodological element was introduced in the assessment of quality, which was the so-called 
‘subject review’. The initial post-1992 years saw two main streams of quality assurance: one 
led by the Quality Assessment Committee (QAC) and the other by the Higher Education 
Quality Council (HEQC). ‘The QAC (as suggested by its very title) had a statutory obligation 
to assess institutional quality and report back to the Funding Council, whereas the HEQC was 
responsible to its founding bodies (CVCP, CDP and SCOP) and engaged essentially in 
institutional audit.’  (Tapper, 2007: 180). However, ‘[t]here was widespread agreement that 
this was an inefficient and costly regulatory model, and the purpose of quality assurance 
needed to be redefined and made the responsibility of one body' (Tapper, ibid). In 1997, 
therefore, the HEQC was abolished and the QAA was established and took over its tasks. 
 
It is also the first time that the term ‘quality’ appears in the title of an institution in relation to 
higher education in the UK. The principal element of the methodological profile of the 
HEQC was institutional audit, while its main aims were accountability and quality 
enhancement (Williams, 1994: paragraph 2, iv). One of the principal aims of the audit was ‘to 
give institutions an opportunity to render themselves accountable for the quality of their 
educational provision to all those who have a legitimate interest in what is being offered in 
higher education’ (ibid).  There was a three-day visit by three auditors who had to analyze 
‘extensively’ institutional documentation. ‘Reports, usually about 10,000-12,000 words long, 
have both formative and judgmental elements, but do not offer categorical judgments of the 
‘satisfactory/unsatisfactory’ type. They are published by HEQC’ (Williams, 1994: vii). 
‘Audit procedures published reports which in effect give a picture of the strengths and 
weaknesses of quality assurance at the university or college concerned’ (HEQC, 1995: 1). 
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The goal for all this was ‘quality enhancement and dissemination of good practice’ by the 
Council’s Quality Enhancement Group (HEQC interviewee). 
 
The Quality Assurance Agency  
The QAA was established in 1997 ‘to provide an integrated quality assurance service for UK 
higher education’ (QAA 2008). This integrated quality assurance service was an attempt to 
combine course and institutional evaluation. It was established by the Joint Planning Group 
(JPG) in an attempt to create a structure that would amalgamate the two quality assurance 
models. Tapper (2007), has described this outcome – the establishment of the QAA – as a 
‘politically constructed’ product: the representative higher education bodies would constitute 
the company (that is the QAA), while its board of directors was to be a mixture of members 
drawn from those representative bodies and the funding councils but also to incorporate six 
so-called ‘independent’ directors who would be ‘representative of the wider community with 
an interest in quality and standards in higher education’ (CVCP/HEFCE, September 1996 in 
Tapper, 2007: 21).   
 
There are, at least, two eras for the QAA – from 1997 to 2001 and from 2001 to the present.  
The first period ends with the resignation, on 21st August 2001, of John Randall, the Chief 
Executive of the QAA. There was a transitional period and, then, Peter Williams took over as 
the new Chief Executive. The main difference between the two eras of the QAA is that in the 
former era the QAA included a scoring method in its methodology. The subject review was 
an element that the QAA had inherited from HEFCE/HEQC. However, the subject reviews, 
and particularly the numerical scoring, were heavily criticized by the academic community 
leading to a crisis in the QAA’s methodology.  
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The growing hostility was most vividly illustrated by the response of Warwick University’s 
Economics Department to its QAA inspection, which resulted in the award of the maximum 
score of 24 – ‘We have to stop the QAA monster or it will eat us alive’! (Macleod, 30th 
January 2001). The subject review element was characterized as ‘the most damaging and 
destructive system of regulation that could possibly has ever been devised’ (ibid). What the 
six Professors at Warwick were arguing was that the QAA methodology was not scientific 
and objective as the QAA presented it: as the scores were based in part on how institutions 
presented themselves, and that the QAA changed its methodology over time making 
comparability impossible.  
 
The second era of the QAA (2001– to the present) is characterized by a ‘lighter touch’ 
methodology. There are two reasons for this claim. First, the QAA abandoned, except in 
exceptional cases, subject reviews along with the numerical scores that accompanied those 
reviews. Second, it switched its attention from courses to institutions (i.e. institutional 
review/audit). Moreover, these developments have been reinforced by the arrival of the 
National Student Survey (NSS). The latter was an initiative of HEFCE, which exercises its 
overall statutory authority for quality through its Quality Assessment Committee (QAC).  
 
In its Strategic Plan 2006-11, the QAA announced a new way forward: ‘maximizing the 
benefits of our work by devoting more resources to development and enhancement across the 
UK’ (QAA 2008). Was this an indicator of the limitations of quality assurance? One of the 
main challenges for the QAA had been the idea of ‘quality assurance’ itself. Although they 
bear the title ‘quality assurance agency’, as an interviewee from the QAA directorate 
suggested, ‘quality assurance agencies can’t assure quality. They can observe, comment, 
report or make recommendations. Only the people providing the programmes can actually 
14 
 
assure quality’. Similarly, a senior member of the HEQC observes: ‘you cannot create quality 
from the outside’. After almost twenty years of quality assurance procedures in the UK, it can 
be argued that ‘quality assurance’ in itself is limited. 
 
A schematic summary  
It is possible now, therefore, to set out in schematic form the major constituents of quality 
assurance methodologies (see table 1). They can be listed as follows: 
 Visits 
 Subject/course focus 
 Institutional focus 
 Interaction with course team 
 External examiners and their reports 
 Scoring methods/numerical approach 
 Audit  
 Public reports  
 
Methodologies are derived from the quality assessment institutions, which have their 
preferred models with prohibitions on alternative approaches. Several elements will comprise 
a quality profile, but each such element has to be understood with the other elements. For 
example, the subject review had a different meaning dependent upon the scoring method; or 
the ‘new’ QAA approach contributed to the rise of a managerial discourse, as after the 
establishment of the QAA, universities had to appoint quality managers in order to respond to 
a more complex QAA methodology (see table 1). There may be structures that offer no space 
for interaction between quality assurance institutions and universities, no space for dialogue 
(for example the numerical approach), especially where the power difference is notable. A 
large differential in power can be used by a quality agency to control and structure the 
interaction. Legitimacy, therefore, in a quality system may be defined by the particular 
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distribution of power, and the sections above have presented a broad overview of the 
evolution of the structures and process of quality assurance in the UK to illustrate that point. 
 
Table 1: Quality elements of different quality bodies in England (including the CNAA) 
 
[Insert Table 1 here – please see page 30] 
 
Key Explanation 
(∨) not compulsory methodological element but occasionally present 
∨ compulsory methodological element  
∨∨ compulsory and important methodological element  
∨∨∨ compulsory and dominant methodological element  
× absence of the particular methodological element 
 
The contemporary 
Quality mechanisms such as the QAA in the UK are designed to collect information, link 
with institutional and other data, and evaluate the teaching and learning infrastructure of 
higher education providers with a particular focus on academic standards. Of themselves 
some of these processes are not new. What is new and politically sensitive as seen in the new 
Green Paper (2015) and the proposed TEF is the combining of the teaching quality and fees. 
The ready justification for this endeavour is that:  
‘The TEF will increase students’ understanding of what they are getting for their 
money and improve the value they derive from their investment, protecting the interest 
of the taxpayer who supports the system through provision of student loans. It should 
also provide better signalling for employers as to which providers they can trust to 
produce highly skilled graduates’ (BIS, 2015: 12-13). 
 
However, for universities the attractions of the TEF are less obvious. The TEF constitutes a 
form of information, which in turn poses concerns about the issue of academic standards and 
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its handling compared to previous quality reviews. Although current quality reviews may 
contain similar information about an institution, and both are publicly available, the new 
proposals links fee caps to multiple levels of TEF. A key question now arises: under market 
conditions, where higher education is itself being marketized, is a quality assurance system 
needed? And, if so, what is its role to be?  
 
As the UK government recognised, the higher education market is now seen to require a 
‘robust framework’ if they are to carry out their work with the active support of its key 
stakeholders such as students and universities. Thus the quality discourse is elevated to the 
status of a sine qua non of the marketisation project. For students this can be construed as a 
discourse regarding the use of the teaching quality information where the key question is the 
relationship between, on the one hand, their interests as consumers over that information 
(BIS, 2015: 59) and, on the other, the interests of the universities, employers and the state. 
Effectively, then, what we are looking at is an interests-based discourse of power over the 
control of higher education which, depending on the juxtapositioning of the values within that 
discourse, will establish and legitimate a particular balance of power between the 
participants. To the extent that students’ interests over the teaching quality information are 
expanded or contracted, so also is the nature of higher education. 
 
Certainly, the UK government is aware that the political sensitivity of the increasing 
marketisation of higher education requires changes in the form of its regulation (King & 
Norton 2013). Its 2010 review of the Browne advisory review for the future of higher 
education funding in England concluded with a commitment to ‘choice’ in terms of enhanced 
‘quality’, ‘public interest’ and broadened definitions of ‘higher education’ (Browne 2010). 
The political ambition of these recommendations was to use the principle of ‘choice’ as a 
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source of free market economy to shore up the legitimacy of the advice and decisions of the 
regulatory committees.  
 
However, choice is, at best, a vague and ill-defined response to the political problem of 
regulatory legitimacy (cf. Apple 2005; Olssen & Peters 2005), often regarded with suspicion 
and hostility by the established culture of the UK’s academic and student body (Reay et al 
2001). Questions such as what choice means in practice and how the criteria for new higher 
education providers should be determined, or whether relying on the prospect of relevant 
information being put into the public domain so that students can make well-informed, or 
even ‘rational’ choices, is a feasible agenda, and have become the object of political 
wrangling (cf. Giroux 2015). Thus, the ‘public realm’, as described by Foucault (1990), is 
gradually being restricted by the infusion of private financial arrangements into public 
institutions (cf. McGettigan 2013), and the concept of ‘governmentality’ further adds to this 
an analysis of the individualization of subjectivity, as the public identity of ‘citizen’ is 
replaced by discourses of ‘consumer choice’ and ‘personal responsibility’ (Foucault 1991, 
Rose 1999). 
 
From this perspective it is not surprising that one of the most notable political consequences 
of the uncertainties surrounding the new quality agenda has been the adaptation of regulatory 
forms to include expert committees dealing with, and pronouncing on, the economic 
implications of higher education. Their purpose is to routinize the discussion of the economic 
rationality of higher education and provide an authoritative means for resolving political 
struggles. Accompanying this new legitimating function has been a new discourse as a 
descriptor for the committees, that of ‘social mobility’ and ‘widening participation’ (cf. BIS, 
2015: 36). However, system stratification tends to reinforce social stratification (Marginson 
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2016), and the intended differential levels of institutional income, deriving from different 
TEF evaluations, and the greater institutional hierarchies that this is likely to bring should 
lead to a rise in social inequality. 
 
Currently interpretations of the development of the new field of quality differ markedly in 
terms of such basic questions as ‘what it is’ and ‘where it is going’. As discussed previously, 
there is an evolutionary process through three phases of ‘quality assurance’, ‘light touch’ 
quality assurance and, finally, ‘quality enhancement’. Thus there has been energetic debate 
over the need for quality assurance, on the one hand, to adopt coherent principles and rules 
and, on the other, to incorporate an appropriate recognition of institutional diversity and, 
therefore, focus on quality enhancement. Meanwhile, some external critiques have viewed its 
origins as more political than ethical, driven by the utilitarian service of interests rather than 
the focus on ‘enhancement’ as such. To that extent the quality agenda may be portrayed as 
performing the classic function of an ideology as much as that of socio-political activity.  
However the term ‘quality enhancement’ hardly appears in the new Green Paper. The Green 
Paper primarily focuses on ‘teaching excellence’ and ‘regulation’, while ‘quality 
enhancement’ within the context of ‘teaching excellence’ seems to be the role of the Higher 
Education Academy (HEA 2016). But ‘excellence’ is, at least, an ‘empty concept’ (cf. 
Readings 1996), if not as ‘ideologically heavy’ as quality assurance (Filippakou 2011). 
  
One of the conclusions of the English experience so far is that the rise of the quality 
assurance discourse changed the power relations of governance, with the state having more 
power, and the quality agenda becomes a vehicle for advancing a further ideological project, 
that of the market. Specifically: 
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(i) higher education appears not only as a product itself but also is developing its own 
market; 
(ii) higher education is expected to focus on ‘employers’ interests and employability; 
(iii) ‘training’ and the ‘skills agenda’  are being promoted; 
(iv) the student is a ‘customer’ and universities become ‘providers’; 
(v) learning is translated into applied economic value; 
(vi) often research attracts its own quality assurance systems and the presence of parallel 
quality systems (for teaching and for research) has been a contributory factor in 
driving a wedge between research and teaching. It has also undermined the 
importance of the presence of both for the existence of a university, while the new 
TEF should enable teaching focused private providers to compete on a ‘level playing 
field’ (BIS 2015). 
 
With the emergence of the European Higher Education Area it looked like that the European 
higher education systems were moving towards a centralised model of control but now with 
the emergence of TEF (and increasing market forces) in the UK and the Brexit vote, England 
may move in a different direction.  Under conditions of marketization, quality assurance 
becomes a market-oriented steering mechanism, intended to increase the power of students-
as-customers (as the earlier efforts to create a market and differences in fee levels have 
largely failed). Are there strong enough historical and cultural links to bind the different 
national systems together to sustain a common framework of quality control? Or will 
different national political pressures push them in varying directions with England moving 
towards the US model (cf. Palfreyman & Tapper 2014)? What is the possibility of cross-
adoption, or a pan-European quality assurance system, in the light of these developments? Or 
will the widely shared power of the market be the unifying driving force?  
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A note on the discourse of quality and the ‘European’ quality agenda 
Quality assurance agencies may not be a united epistemic community but it is an influential 
transnational policy network capable of working across the political spaces of multi-level 
governance to help shape the national politics of the legitimation of the quality agenda. At the 
European Union (EU) level, ‘(f)ollowing the Recommendation of the Council (98/561/EC of 
24 September 1998) on European co-operation in quality assurance in higher education and 
the Bologna Declaration of 1999’, the European Network for Quality Assurance Agencies 
(ENQA), and the European Quality Assurance Register (EQAR) have played an important 
role in the development of new regulatory mechanisms, particularly in relation to quality 
assurance and accreditation.  
 
Propelled by the continuing activities and reports of the Bologna Process, the Declaration has 
acted as the template and rationale for a series of quality initiatives by different national 
states. The Bologna Process is a reform based on the Lisbon Strategy (March 2000) 
(European Commission 2016) whose aim is the economic development of Europe and 
universities are seen as part of this economic growth. To reach that goal, quality mechanisms 
have been very important:  
‘The key players are the Ministers, the Commission; and the Commission has its own 
agenda here. The Commission wants a very, very instrumental higher education 
system across Europe, the more centralized, homogenized it is, the better from their 
point of view.  So they don’t like all these national systems because it, they think that, 
with some justification weaker countries will have no incentive actually to modernize 




Despite the national differences, the European Commission has succeeded in pushing the 
quality agenda and we see quality as an ‘evolutionary’ process: ‘What the universities are 
going to do when they see these, well, what, they just won’t understand and when we wrote 
the standards and guidelines we make it very clear that this is a process, this is a 
evolutionary process…’ (ENQA board member). To illustrate the picture schematically, 
quality systems can be located somewhere within the following quadrants (diagram 1). 
 
Diagram 1: A diagrammatic representation of national quality systems   
[Please insert diagram 1: page 31] 
 
This diagram prompts the following considerations: 
a) Empirically, most national systems are above the horizontal line, that is, they have been 
dominated by quality assurance. 
b) The space below the horizontal line (i.e. national quality systems driven by quality 
enhancement) is a theoretical space which is very thinly populated at the moment. 
c) The space below the horizontal line is an opportunistic space in the sense that it offers 
opportunities for the development of national quality systems. In the UK, particularly in 
England and Wales, we saw a migration – the system was moving from above to below 
the horizontal line, from quality assurance to enhancement but ‘excellence’ can be seen as 
a strongly codified quality assurance space. 
d) We can say that Scotland is probably already below the horizontal line, because it has an 




e) It is probable that quadrant 4 (enhancement led systems which are fluid and less 
controlled) is currently empty, as there is no empirical evidence to suggest any system 
inhabits this space. 
 
For many European countries, the ‘European dimension’ seems to be an important parameter 
in the formation of the new national quality system. The question is: can this framework 
represent the voices of all European higher education systems? As another ENQA board 
member suggests, this is practically impossible:  ‘Well ENQA, at least in theory, represents 
the collective voice of quality assurance agencies in Europe. But there is no collective voice 
because there are 45 different signatories into Bologna, only, not all of them have agencies 
and all the agencies do different things in different ways’. 
It seems, therefore, that a major challenge for any EU policy is cross-adoption. As an 
interviewee suggested, ‘there are dangers if member states do not take into account their 
contextual differences’; ‘quality’ is part of the Western European tradition, particularly the 
Anglo-Saxon countries, and the European guidelines for quality are ‘alien’ to other European 
countries: ‘But I think we now have the European standards and guidelines which the further 
east you go across Europe the more alien they are to the traditions… but when you get to 
some of the more remote European countries and the very, very far east, you will start finding 
countries saying we do not understand and therefore, or worse than that they’ll say yes we 
understand and think they understand, and pretend they understand but will just carry on 
doing what they’re doing’ (ENQA interviewee). 
The evidence suggests, therefore, that as an epistemic community the discourse of quality is 
certainly not yet fully formed. Rather, what we have is a hybrid group of interests drawn from 
a variety of discourses with a common interest in the definition, organization and application 
of arguments regarding the future of the quality agenda. Yet despite the self-evident 
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inconsistencies and confusions surrounding its identity, the social and political value of the 
quality label continues to increase when measured in terms of such crude quantitative indices 
as numbers of courses, conferences, websites and committees. As an epistemic community it 
may be divided and conflictual but this has in no way inhibited its expansion as a socio-
political activity and, as the growth of institutions and their role demonstrate, it has political 
utility. Their influential presence in the higher education discourse can be viewed as a shift 
from legitimation within states to a regional legitimation and as constituting a natural 
extension of their political interest in ensuring that the quality agenda continues to achieve its 
legitimating goals.  
 
There are, however, important implications: there are power asymmetries both among and 
between states and market interests. It is not just that the procedures may differ but also that 
the process may serve contrasting policy goals. Any transfer of policy could suggest that a 
distinctive and deeply-rooted tradition of higher education is under attack, in this case that 
something more than the instigation of accountability mechanisms and the desire to monitor 
institutional performance is at stake. The issue, therefore, is whether a policy idea can be 
transferred across national boundaries in a manner than harmonizes with the established 
traditions and yet still retains its original purpose. As differences find expression – as in the 
UK case – the political test of an epistemic community’s legitimating strength will be its 
ability to routinize the discussion of differences and so reconcile national interests with the 
interests of the supranational state and market. 
 
Conclusion 
In the last three decades the idea of quality in higher education has been re-positioned 
discursively (in many societies): there are statements which suggest that now many more 
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systems than before can and should be doing it; that it is very useful and relevant as a guide 
to academic standards; and that it has a strong and obvious immediacy in terms of its ability 
to come to grips the ‘Bologna Process’. The ideology of markets and state control in the 
history of the quality agenda has helped to permit a whole range of institutionalised activities 
to be gathered together under the concept of ‘quality’ to the point where serious 
epistemological, ethical and political confusions are occurring.  
 
The vocabularies of the politics of the quality agenda and higher education rapidly overlap: 
Europeanisation, harmonisation, modernisation, social capital, lifelong learning, economic 
competitiveness. Politically, these are already salient policy topics in the European higher 
education agenda, while discursively (in the higher education journals, in higher education 
books and conferences) such themes often dominate our paradigmatic intellectual agenda. 
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Diagram 1: A diagrammatic representation of national quality systems   
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